1 equal participation of women and men in political and public decision making have been introduced in one hundred states and constitutionally entrenched in fifteen. 2 With 5-10 constitutions due for design and redesign each year, 3 new statutes being introduced to respond to gender-based disadvantages and harms, and attention to gender in forums of representation a "signifier of democratic credentials for countries transitioning from authoritarianism and/or conflict', 4 these extraordinary changes in the field of public law call for close analysis.
It is no coincidence that many of these changes to the public law of gender post-date the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women ('CEDAW'), adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1979. 5 Half of the world's new constitutions have been drafted since 1974, with significant outside influence. 6 Initiatives for 'gender mainstreaming' and 'women's empowerment' have -at least formally -occupied international organizations since 1995, 7 and influenced international sponsorship and advice on the public laws of individual states, particularly those in the Global South.
While these gender-sensitive developments can be credited to the success of locally and globally networked women's movements (and other gender-recognition or human equality-based movements), 8 they are also the result of other transnational forces, including economic liberalization, by which countries revise their systems of governance in order to secure foreign approval and capital and/or a higher ranking of development. 9 The entanglement of these processes complicates the global efforts of gender advocates and calls for scholarly investigation in multiple locales. Our study includes the perspectives of constitutional, administrative and international lawyers, as well as historians, ethnographers and political scientists, to analyse critically these apparent accomplishments.
Thus, with the worldwide sweep of these gender-equal or gender-cognizant, public laws, one question recurs -has this widespread legal reform led to real change? Women, in particular, continue to experience an array of gender-based harms: persistent, and welldocumented vulnerability to violence, including sexual violence, insecurity, and poverty; circumscribed access to education, property and credit; workplace disadvantage and harassment; greater involvement in household and care work, without material recognition; and a continued inability to access the political forums and public laws in which these problems have often been sidelined or misunderstood. While these problems may seem intractable for different reasons: culture, ideology, power, political economyit is clear that law continues to constitute, or insulate, these various effects. Thus it is critical to understand and critique the operation of formal law as one aspect of the continuing gap between the advocacy of gender justice or equality and its substantive achievement.
This volume brings international law together with domestic constitutional and statutory law to explore the dimensions of this gap and what is particular to the gender question.
Three general explanations are common in each field. The first is a gap in enforcement: just as international law exists famously without a centralized enforcement mechanism, so too does domestic constitutional law lack the guarantee of enforcement, even, it might be argued, in systems with judicial review. 10 The breach of a formal guarantee of gender equality, for example, may lack sanctions at both the international level (where, for discussion of the links between the 'good governance' project and gender equality, see Sharon Bessell's chapter, below; Kate Wilkinson. 10 example, the CEDAW Committee provides recommendations only) 11 and at the domestic, constitutional level, where constitutional courts may decline to enforce contentious constitutional provisions in order to avoid the deep political contestations that will result. 12 Of course, judicial enforcement is not the only function of formal law -it has expressive, coordinating and educative functions that all help to secure greater compliance. Moreover, the underenforcement of law by courts -where courts avoid direct enforcement with the expectation that other branches of government will tackle certain complex policy questions, such as those required to implement 'positive' obligations attached to rights to education or health care, 13 can apply with particular force to gender equality. The thesis of this book is that aspects of the 'gap' explained by nonenforcement and underenforcement can generate productive insights when fields of international and public law are brought together. 14 The second is a gap in sincerity. International treaties, especially the foundational human rights covenants, have always attracted the criticism of window dressing, as states are free to ratify treaties without making any reforms in domestic law. 15 A similar criticism has been made about the phenomenon of 'sham constitutions', whereby countries 11 See, e.g., Andrew Byrnes, 'The Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women' in Anne Hellum andHenriette Sinding Aasen (eds), Women's Human Rights: CEDAW in International, Regional, and National Law (Cambridge University Press, 2015) 25, 39-48 (noting the effectiveness of General Recommendations, as well as the very modest role of individual communications due to limited membership of the Optional Protocol). For recent analysis of the information-generating role of CEDAW, see Cosette Creamer and Beth A Simmons, 'Do Self-Reporting Regimes Matter? Evidence from the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women' (draft paper, 2015, copy on file with author). regularly violate the very rights that their constitutions purport to guarantee. 16 While the challenge of sincerity is related to the previously described problem of enforcement, it exists independently as a denial of the normative force of the law, which cannot be explained on formal institutional grounds. This 'performance gap' in the formal law has been observed to occur more for some legal protections than others: gender is one such area, as is substantive equality more generally. 17
The third explanation for an observed gap in formal law and its effect on the ground is its coverage: both international law and constitutional law carve out a number of exceptions of application that can have a significant impact on gender. Most prominent in the gap in coverage is the public/private distinction, in which both international and public law are said to be concerned only with the regulation of the public sphere. This distinction is dealt with in more detail later in the section 'Defining Public Law', but it can be seen that, through reserving particular areas of law from constitutional reach, such as religious personal laws or customary law or private law more generally, 18 or through permitting far-reaching reservations in international human rights law that do the same, 19 the application of public law has limited effect to challenge gendered disadvantage in the very spheres in which it is most heavily experienced and perpetuated. The question of coverage is also raised by the multiple layers of authority created by federalism and its special impact on issues of gender. 20 These explanations apply to each field: indeed, hypotheses of gaps have been made since the earliest legal realist insight of the distinction between the law in the books and the law 16 David S. Law and Mila Versteeg, Sham Constitutions, 101 Cal. L. Rev. 863 (2013) . 17 Ibid (noting differences in respect paid to, for example, death penalty prohibitions and economic and social rights). 18 in action. 21 They also explain both more, and less, than the coexistence of formal equality and substantive inequality. This volume extends enforcement, sincerity and coverage rationales in public and international law to give greater attention to their application to gender. *** This book defines the public law of gender as an analytical category in which to study law's structuring of politics, governing and gender. This includes the role that gender plays in themes of representation and participation in both 'government' and 'governance'. The distinction between those terms is meant to highlight the different ways in which power has been and continues to express itself from the local to the global.
We ask how 'gender' has engaged with those structures and concepts, and how these structures and concepts depend on or enlist gendered roles. These enquiries engage public law in national, international and transnational perspectives, and also the broad work of constitutional design and governance theory, including concerns coming under the headers of accountability, participation, transparency and rights. A focus on gender in the contested public sphere also invites a rethinking of judicial, legislative and executive processes under the traditional public law fields of constitutional and administrative law. Feminism -and feminisms -provide the theoretical tools for this analysis, from which to analyse the category of 'gender', as well as other legal categorisations, such as the guarantee of equality, and the public/private distinction, which are detailed in the following sections.
Defining Gender
Gender is not 'real or self-evident or in the nature of things'; 22 nonetheless, it is a powerful construct, based on perceived differences between the sexes, that has served to 21 Roscoe Pound, 'Law in Books and Law in Action' (1910) 44 American Law Review 12. 22 See e.g., Joan Scott, 'Gender: A Useful Category for Historical Analysis' (1986) 91 American Historical Review 1053, 1067; note also the way gender is conceived by the CEDAW Committee as referring to 'socially constructed identities, attributes and roles for women and men and society's social and cultural meaning for these biological differences resulting in hierarchical relationships between women and men organise social relations and roles in various ways throughout the world. The use of 'gender' as an analytical category, rather than as an essentialised identity or universal causal force, can help to uncover the pervasiveness of gender assumptions against various cultural backgrounds and histories. 23 In this vein, this book draws on the core assumption of feminism -that an inequality experienced along gender lines must be subject to challenge. Such an assumption holds value for women, men and transgender persons, and the book deals with all three gendered identities, with most chapters canvassing the particular impacts on women that are caused by gendered laws and/or stereotypes and assumptions. Nonetheless, we take issue with certain United Nations policies that have been observed to 'assume that "gender" is a synonym for women'. 24 One chapter interrogates the harm caused by formal rules of gender discrimination on men as fathers; 25 others include perspectives that analyse gender-based harms on both women and on certain groups of men; 26 Despite this range, the bulk of the chapters deal with women -which is a reflection of the disproportionate harm to women caused by gendered laws and assumptions, on a sheer numbers basis: yet we acknowledge the heterogeneity of women's interests and experiences. The chapters of this book therefore encompass the various experiences of women along different axes -such as race, class, age, disability, ethnicity, religion, sexual orientation, locality, geography and, critically, jurisdiction. Again, feminist theory provides important resources to understand the intersection of various inequalities and identity categories as well as gender. 28 This focus on intersectionality is most suited to the book's combined focus on the experience of women in both the Global South and North. For example, the following chapters are able to problematise the experience of a minority group, Muslim women in India, whose experience under the Indian Constitution is very different from that of Hindu women in India; 29 and of aboriginal, Muslim and Mormon women in Canada, whose experience of living in polygamous relationships may be very different from the expectations of other women and men in Canada, and of each other; 30 and of women's organisers in Colombia, whose gendered disadvantage cannot be divorced from their experience of extreme poverty and insecurity. 31 Gender may be a category that builds solidarity between women (and others), but it does not follow that the consequences of this category are the same across our sites of analysis.
Defining Public Law
Public law has a long history of supporting the 'legalized subordination' of women; as well as their invisibility. Public law is primarily concerned with the relationship between individuals and the state, and between the state and other government actors. This book 28 For presentation of these ideas, see Jackson, above n 16; see, e.g., Kimberlé Crenshaw, 'Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race explores both explicitly gendered public laws, such as equality guarantees (predominantly expressed in relation to sex or gender 32 ), as well as facially neutral public laws, that may help to sustain many disparities between men and women. Public laws are not formally concerned with the choices made and the actions between individuals, which are, in the main, governed by private law such as contract, property and tort; nonetheless, they influence these choices in critical ways. 33 Moreover, a raft of antidiscrimination and accommodation statutes that reach into employment, for example, can be considered 'public law', due to the state's efforts to ensure that private relations are consistent with equality guarantees. 34 While these distinctions are made differently in civil and common law systems, this book adopts the category of 'public law' as a heuristic to interrogate the international, constitutional and statutory laws applicable to the state and government but does not assume that they are wholly separate from private application, particularly when those relations are enforced through laws of contract, property or tort. We acknowledge, therefore, that 'what is public in one society may well be private in another'. 35 Indeed, the challenge to the distinction between public and private spheres, so long fostered by feminist activism, has become integrated into some versions of public law.
Many modern constitutions now recognise the 'horizontal effect' of public laws and require private individuals and groups to respect the constitutional rights and principles expressed in the public sphere. 36 While the 'state action' doctrine in the United States and Canada, for instance, reserves the application of the Constitution to cases involving state-individual interactions, there is nevertheless scope in those jurisdictions to develop the common law indirectly, in line with constitutional principles. 37 Elsewhere, private law is subject to the 'radiating effect' of the constitutional law, whereby courts are compelled to adhere to constitutional rights or values when applying private law. 38 The jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, in recognising the positive obligations of states to secure protections as between private parties, has also challenged conventional expectations of the divide between public and private law. 39 As certain chapters suggest, the increasing recognition of positive obligations of gender equality, and other positive state duties, expands the reach of public law into private domains of subordination. 40 Moreover, the very shift from government to governance that is evident in other chapters 41 signifies how various private, nonstate entities are now sourced to deliver services and perform other traditional state functions. Thus, at the same time as workplaces, 42 militaries 43 and other organisations must respect certain employment and criminal laws, the increasing number and range of public/private partnerships change the scope of public law. Accompanying this market-based challenge to the public/private distinction comes an assumption that the more 'family-like' an association or group, the 37 Helen Herschkoff, '"Just Words": Common Law 40 E.g., Jackson, above n 16; Allen, above n 38; and see generally the exchange on recognising a constitutional role for religious and customary law in the chapters in Part II. 41 E.g., Bessell, above n 10; see further Jody Freeman, 'The Private Role in Public Governance' (2000) 75 NYU Law Review 543. 42 Allen, above n 38. 43 Harris Rimmer, above n 28. less likely public laws should be able to access it. 44 Yet this normative assumption, too, requires critical examination. How 'family-like' are indigenous communities in Western settler states, 45 polygamous unions in multicultural states 46 or traditional communities living under constitutionally prescribed customary law? 47 Attempts to prohibit gender discrimination in these communities are complicated by exceptions carved out for religious freedom, cultural rights or privacy in the previously described coverage terms.
The private sphere continues to be legally insulated in many parts of the world, and private subordination usually corresponds with subordination in the public sphere. As we shall see, public laws to end subordination may sometimes increase women's experiences of subordination in the home and community. 48 Such dynamics are complicated by the public recognition of religious and customary laws, including trends in accommodation, access to courts, and the codification of custom. 49 While this is not true for all places, the traditional feminist contestations between sameness and difference, or essentialism and pluralism, have very different political valences in such places. 50
From the Local to the Global
This insight complicates the local/global frame that this book incorporates. While transcending boundaries has been a central trope of feminist analysis, 51 the borders of states, and the sorting of regions (such as the Global North and the Global South, the core and the periphery, the developed and the developing world 52 ), and the distinction 44 Gover, above n 38; Olsen, above n 37. 45 Gover, above n 38. 46 Baines, above n 32. 47 Attention to these processes requires an explicitly global/local perspective, which reviews the gender-related developments (and omissions) in subnational and transnational laws and their influence on domestic lawmaking and substantive laws. Certainly, the frame of human rights is one that is peculiarly suited to incorporating transnational, international and national laws and interactions. 53 Constitutions that incorporate international law directly also prompt an inclusive study. 54 The following chapters broaden the perspective of comparative constitutional law and human rights by highlighting what is captured by a gendered analysis when fields of international and public law are brought together. These include the usual areas in which a global perspective is taken, but that impact on gender 52 Eg Loveday Hodson, Women's Rights and the Periphery: CEDAW's Optional Protocol, 25 Eur. J. Int'l L. 561 (2014) 25 European Journal of International Law 561; D Bonilla Maldonado (ed), Constitutionalism of the Global South (Cambridge University Press, 2013)(presenting India, South Africa and Colombia as case studies that illustrate post-colonial constitutionalism, while not seeking to carve out a comprehensive and distinctive framework for a constitutionalist approach of the Global South); see also Penelope Andrews, From Cape Town to Kabul: Rethinking Strategies for Pursuing Women's Human Rights (Ashgate, 2012) 19, 80 (rejecting a monolithic 'us' and a monolithic 'them' while suggesting that non-elite women from the Global South may have more in common with each other than with elites in the South and women in the North). 
Intersecting Observations on Public Law
This book is situated in a number of intersecting literatures. While the study of the configuration of gender in public law -and the exclusion of women from the very origins of the state -has been a vigorous one in particular domestic contexts, 55 this book also stands on the shoulders of a number of recent works in comparative constitutional law that have drawn attention both to the distinctive treatments of gender in comparative constitutional jurisprudence 56 and the importance of gender categories in constitutional design. 57 These studies have challenged the gendered nature of constitutional principles, including the traditional sidelining of central issues of concern for women, such as reproductive rights, economic and social rights, the regulation of group rights of minorities as core principles and the traditional liberal distinction between public and private realms. 58 55 These works expand the accelerating field of comparative constitutional law, 59 and its attention to the migration of public law ideas across the world. 3260 Gender equality is one such idea, and has taken flight along with many of the same processes of borrowing and transplants that have been germane to other trends. 61 It is clear that networks of transnational women's and human rights activists have been important agents for these migrations, 62 in ways that may be quite distinct from the ensemble of constitutional ideas understood as 'generic' constitutional law. 63 As a historical matter, efforts to challenge the configuration of gender roles have often involved an appeal beyond the nation-state, with opponents coining their arguments in terms of the 'jurisdictional proprietary of leaving issues of gender to the nation-state'. 64 At this juncture, the insights learned from feminist approaches to international law help to clarify what is particularly untransplantable about such norms, as opposed to other human rights.
Indeed, recent empirical studies of state lawmaking suggest that the recognition of women's rights (post the initial stage by early adopters of women's suffrage) correlates less with domestic political conditions than with international 'contagion' effects. 65 Nonconformist states 'joined the bandwagon' against domestic violence, for example, 'despite dramatic differences in women's political power or access to economic resources at the national level'. 66 Others inquire into how active women's movements during periods of transition have been 'unable to translate the importance of their activism ... into greater gains in the immediate post-transition period'. 67 These dynamics reveal stark questions about whether women's power and women's preferences have now surfaced in these places or have instead been coopted and sidelined by the global 'gender agenda'.
The question of origins has been posed explicitly by legal scholars critical of the rise of 'governance feminism'. 68 Tracking the apparent increase of influence by women's rights advocates within the international lawmaking field, these scholars have together explored the suggestion that 'feminism rules' and has become responsible as a 'wielder of power' in governance. 69 Under this lens, they describe a new feminist influence in lawmaking processes, such as the drafting of the Statute of the International Criminal Court(the Rome Statute) and its successful incorporation of rape as an international crime. 70 Yet while the accomplishments of governance feminism may be seen as a gain for women, the regime's focus on crime, punishment and victims also counts as a loss in terms of what forms of women's agency are excluded or denied. Indeed, these authors suggest that recent international successes for women have privileged only certain 'variants' of feminism -'carceral' feminism (with an undue focus on criminalisation), radical feminism (with an undue focus on subordination) and liberal feminism (with Western imperial overtones and a blindness to power). 71 Claims of 'governance feminism' have generated healthy reflection within feminist approaches to international law; 72 while welcome, however, some of the most pointed criticisms of those writing against 'governance feminism' (such as those relating to the excessive focus on criminalisation and undue spotlight given to sex trafficking in international law) have been too particular to describe the whole of international lawmaking, in which feminist power is in short supply. 73 
Outline
We have divided the book into six parts, reflecting different aspects of the interaction between public law and gender, as well as different diagnoses and solutions to the problem of gender inequality. Thus we travel from issues of constitutional law and comparative constitutional design, to a study of participation and voice through law, and then to an interrogation of governance laws, including representation and gendered measures, and equality and non-discrimination. Finally, we turn to the public laws that operate at the level of global governance.
In order of appearance, these chapters encompass the constitutions and other public laws before the law, non-discrimination on the basis of sex and gender, and more substantive ideas of gender equality. Moreover, a host of structural and institutional design features, that include gender 'agnostic' (facially neutral) and gender 'cognizant' prescriptions, can drive particular gender outcomes. These findings are elicited in ways that utilize the idea of a 'gendered constitutional audit', 80 to include analysis of how more general structural issues, such as access to court, or court-government relations, may configure particular gender outcomes.
In her opening chapter on 'Feminisms and Constitutions', Vicki Jackson draws on both new and traditional ideas of constitutional design to outline a range of features that constitutions might have, in order to reflect 'feminist' or 'gender-equal' aspirations and outcomes. 81 Rather than suggesting a single, right, feminist, answer, Jackson is sensitive to the plural, diverse and contingent effects of (varied) feminist thinking in (varied) constitutional contexts. Thus, she emphasizes certain process conditions for constitutional design or constitutional reform, including the relatively equal involvement of women and men, from different sectors of life, geography, occupation, ethnic or religious affiliation, and class; a process informed by a recognition of the need to address persistent "gendered disadvantages to both men and women, but on the whole more to women". 82 Such a process, Jackson suggests, might benefit from the consideration of a range of constitutional features and their impact on gender. Most obvious, she suggests, is the inclusion of rights -to equality, to non-discrimination, to affirmative measures and to economic and social rights such as health (including reproductive health), education and non-violence. Rights, she notes, do not only belong in the realm of what is prohibited on the part of government; they may also raise the question of what is permitted and what is required. The extension of positive duties on the part of the state -including into the 80 Irving, above n 61, 13, 167 (making the historical note, too, that 'gender auditing a constitution is hardly a new idea'). 81 Jackson, above n 16. 
PART II CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN IN A GLOBAL SETTING: THE

CHALLENGE OF THE LOCAL
While constitutional design appears to be a framework issue for the structuring of gender equality, it must contend with the challenge of gaining traction. These four chapters document the contending attempts of achieving both a universal and local reach by constitutional design, particular through the challenge of realizing gender equality in the context of customary laws and religious personal laws that may ascribe particularly rigid 86 Compare with, eg, Muna Ndulo, African Customary Law, Customs, and Women's Rights, 18 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 87, 92 (2011) (recommending a focus on reformist "courts and mass movements"). and/or subordinated gender roles. In such cases, local laws may appear impervious to global intervention: yet local customs, for example, have already been distorted and rigidified by international processes of colonialism, even in remote and rural areas. 87 Moreover, states that endeavor to accommodate legal pluralism are often the most laws must operate in conformity with constitutional principles, and were partly successful.
Nonetheless, Grenfell suggests that the interaction between constitutional equality and customary laws remains unclear. South Africa's Constitution has proved the most robustly protective of gender equality, through Constitutional Court support for an evolving customary law, in which women can participate. Nonetheless, the recent support of the ANC given to traditional leaders suggests how precarious this settlement may be.
In Timor-Leste, limited institutional support for gender equality is reflected in both the legislature and the courts, and gender-discriminating customary laws continue to operate.
In Afghanistan, the situation is complicated by the constitutional recognition of both formal equality and the preeminence of Islamic law. Despite the highly divergent background systems of law operating in her chosen case studies, Grenfell combines these experiences to recommend a more explicit demarcation between gender equality and customary laws (and the priority of the former) in constitutional drafting. One may question the choice of such distinct comparators under the post-conflict theme; but it is clear than in such cases, certain traditional practices have been destabilized, and the moment of seeking equality based reforms for previously excluded groups may be a very narrow one.
Further attention is given to these different settings in the following two chapters, focusing on India and Vanuatu, on the one hand, and Afghanistan again, on the other. For 
PART IV GOVERNANCE, REPRESENTATION AND GENDERED MEASURES
The institutions and processes of public lawmaking are encompassed in the study of governance, which has become a ubiquitous framework for both prescription and critique. In the following two parts, the interactions between gender and governance are analyzed in relation to questions of representation, and questions of equality, respectively. First, a long-standing marker of political representation is the number of women in government. 105 This quantitative measure has been applied to compare particular domestic and regional governments, and to instigate a notion of international best practice, with the idea that the involvement of women in representative roles will translate their political agendas into policies and laws. Three of the following chapters interrogate this marker -including its corollary, quotas -by critiquing notions of representation, participation, and indeed their very measurement. This latter critique is raised in the fourth chapter, in relation to the highly gendered stakes of poverty measurement.
Sharon Bessell's analysis is sited at both global and local levels, and focuses on the role of ideas -world views, principled beliefs, and causal beliefs -that operate at these levels. 106 Wisor suggests how new measures of poverty may be developed through participatory processes that reflect on the values that do and should inform our conception of poverty.
Noting that procedures of deliberation are at risk of reinforcing gender hierarchies and exclusions, he draws on both participatory research and deliberative democratic theory to outline a number of exercises to include the voices of those who have been marginalised.
The variety of techniques that Wisor proposes -including novel uses of weighted analyses, vetoes or formal dissents -suggests that robust processes of public reason can be critical for poor women and men in the measurement of poverty (a form of engagement that Wisor, in collaborative research, has also tested empirically). 110 Wisor also suggests substantive features of these poverty measures that would allow them to reveal gender disparities and concentrate on dimensions of life in which deprivations occur that are particularly important for women. This includes interrogating intrahousehold distributions of resources and burdens by focusing on the individual, collecting an expanded list of information, such as time-use and freedom-from-violence indicators, and being sensitive to biological or social difference. He concludes by refuting the view that quantitative measurement of rights is bad for justice.
PART V GOVERNANCE, EQUALITY AND NON-DISCRIMINATION
The goals of equality, equal treatment, and non-discrimination are invariably complicated in practice. As public law and governance structures have sought to implement such goals, they are confounded by the varied background challenges of social norms, including with respect to race and gender. 111 These chapters, which share many of the normative concerns of the preceding parts of this book, especially Part II, illuminate the various modes of negotiating gender equality, this time in the highly diverse settings of indigenous laws in western settler states and in workplace laws and military settings in Australia.
Kirsty Gover's chapter addresses the "perforation" of anti-discrimination regimes, with respect to race and gender, and to certain associative exceptions, and the distinctive effect of such regimes on the constitution of indigenous communities in western settler states. 112 In Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, indigenous groups are subject to human rights and non-discrimination law, and their reliance on descent-based membership criteria is susceptible to challenge as a prohibited form of racial discrimination. In the public law of these liberal democracies, racial discrimination is subject to a much more comprehensive prohibition than gender discrimination.
Gover points out that while non-discrimination legislation contains numerous exceptions allowing named groups to discriminate in their membership criteria on the basis of gender, there are no exceptions that expressly permit groups to discriminate on the basis of race. Consequently, tribes do not benefit from express exceptions in nondiscrimination legislation allowing certain "private" organizations to self-constitute in ways that would otherwise be unlawful. Yet, as Gover convincingly argues, in liberal settler democracies, the distinctive constitutional status of indigenous individuals and groups is legitimately premised on the legal concept of race. Gover turns to the reasoning deployed for two justified discriminations in Canadian and United Kingdom law -of permitting gender-based exclusions from a single-sex club, and of permitting religiousbased exceptions for racial (descent-based) membership -to suggest that the justifications supporting the exception of families, households, subscriptive associations and religious organizations from non-discrimination law should also support exceptions for indigenous peoples as "racially constituted" groups. Dominique Allen sets out to reassess the model of promoting gender equality in Australia, which she suggests is still partially locked in formal equality, antidiscrimination, and equality of opportunity frameworks. 113 Rimmer is concerned with the practices of gender-based abuse of both women and men that have occurred in the ADF, and the inadequate internal responses that have been followed. Pressure to address these incidents has arisen in Australia and in other western militaries.
With this concern in mind, Harris Rimmer suggests that Australia's Parliament should mandate that gender equality is fundamental to achieving the mission of the ADF as a The formal recognition of gender justice within the Rome Statute for the ICC was the result of concerted feminist legal advocacy, and has helped to orient the Registry towards 115 Jackson, above n 58. a gender-just, victim-centered, framework. Despite this achievement, however, Chappell argues that a set of compounding institutional problems frustrate this effort. These include limitations of the formal rules, scarce resources as well as the conflict between these new rules with older, and informal gender rules that interfere with efforts to address the claims of sexual violence victims, both male and female. Chappell concludes that the ongoing challenge for ICC insiders and those in civil society who are seeking more just gender outcomes is to find ways to circumvent 'old' gender norms and expectations so that 'new' gender justice rules can be instituted. Despite this unprecedented access, and the numerous references to gender equality, women's empowerment, and the "welfare of women" that have been included, Wilkinson deploys an ecofeminist critique to suggest that the ability of the Outcome Document to challenge current gendered (and ecosystem) inequalities has been limited. In particular, Wilkinson suggests that the presentation of a "green economy" has assimilated women and other marginalized groups into the dominant and andocentric project of "sustainable development", and its current privileging of neoliberal political economy. For example, projects to "empower" women continue to devalue their work in the household, in the informal economy, and the "repetitive, local, necessary, communal and embedded [work] in the local ecosystem". 120 It is a fitting conclusion to the book's themes of how the public law of gender is constituted, coopted, and maintained across local and global sites of action.
Conclusion
This is the concluding volume of a six part series 121 that has sought to broaden the scholarship on the ways public law and international law intersects. Its collective message further emphasises that looking beyond the question of how international and public law overlap or beyond how international law is implemented domestically provides us with richer and more fluid frames to think through areas of profound significance. Concluding this series with the theme of gender has enabled us to not only consciously bring together public and international lawyers, political scientists, philosophers, psychologists, and specialists of gender studies, to consider and engage in each others' scholarship, but also to critically examine the contemporary construction and dissemination of this emerging public law field.
By utilizing a focus on gender in public law, we have identified an apparently extraordinary moment of national and transnational feminist influence in the public sphere; coming at the very moment of widespread diminishment of that sphere via contemporaneous constitutional and governance reforms. 122 For the reasons given in these chapters, the question remains as to whether the gender cognizant laws of nondiscrimination, affirmative measures for legislative representation, and other equalitybased initiatives, as well as more facially neutral liberal democratic and judicial reforms, will deliver the positive outcomes that gender advocates have so vigorously sought.
Certainly, the triad of reasons for the gaps identified between formal law's promises and its reality -which I have explained in terms of lapses in enforcement, sincerity and coverage -apply across local, national and transnational domains. Yet many of the chapters of this volume problematise each category. The chapters of Parts I and VIshow how the structures of domestic and especially international law point to the challenge of enforcement: that, for example, it is a lack of enforcement that has allowed genderdiscriminatory laws to continue in the United States or CEDAW recommendations to go unaddressed. Yet these chapters are not unified in their prescriptions for addressing this lapse of enforcement: while one describes how the very ambiguity of enforcement can suppress challenges to gender inequality, another suggests that it may, contrariwise, sustain a more pluralist basis for such challenges over the long term. 123 Amongst the other parts of the book, however, it is striking how lapses in enforcement are much less part of the problem, and how the challenges of coverage and sincerity become less easy to separate. For example, the chapters of Part II, dealing with local custom, and Parts IV and V, dealing with governance, inform our understanding of the problem of coverage, especially in the way that they point to the perpetuation of gendered roles within the private spheres that are left untouched by international or public laws (despite the private law-piercing aims of CEDAW, or of the horizontality of constitutional law, or of the ambitions of the 'global governance' programme 124 ).
Yet here the lapses of coverage appear to blend with those of sincerity. Across both local and global sites of analysis, the documented endeavours for gender neutrality and gender equality in law seem to founder on an antipathy to the lived experience of gender disadvantage. While questioning the sincerity of lawmakers is too simplistic an overlay to the complex descriptions of law and gender within this volume -even as the gendered composition of those lawmakers is made clear, as is most highlighted in Parts III and IV -the question does provide a timely warning that calls for a feminist pluralism do not provide cover for further (antifeminist) insincerity. 125 Thus, there is no single, neat message that concludes this volume. Nonetheless, we hope that it has opened up a research agenda that builds upon both the literatures of feminist constitutionalism and feminist approaches to international law and the common insights 123 Compare Collins, above n 16, with Jackson, above n 16. 124 Representative here is, for example, Bessell, above n 10. 125 For the documentation of the compromises made by local and international organisations in approaching questions of gender, see Bina D'Costa, '"You Cannot Hold Two Watermelons in One Hand": Gender Justice and Anti-State Local Security Institutions in Pakistan and Afghanistan', in Nasu and Rubenstein (eds), above n 125, 47, 52(noting that 'many projects claiming to be gender sensitive are not only explicitly un-feminist but are gender biased. As such, while feminist projects are gender sensitive, not all gender projects are necessarily feminist'). of each. We find several questions particularly suggestive in the current globalised setting. For example, we have not foregrounded economic and social rights, despite the attention of several chapters to the critically gendered nature of poverty 126 and the attempts made in international human rights law and in comparative constitutional law to address material deprivation in terms of rights. 127 This rapidly changing area of law, which allows for an implicit targeting of particularly disadvantaged groups (an implicitness which can be a key to the political success of public policy and public law), is critically important for addressing gender-relevant inequality. 128 Second, we have noted the role of religion in our book, analysing the gender-discriminatory aspects of religious rules in the same space as cultural or customary rules. Nonetheless, due to the hold of religious ideas in public spaces, a future study could attend to the challenge of minority and majority religions across public laws. What is it that connects the genderbased parental roles that have been used to court the Christian right in U.S. politics 129 and the intractability of modesty and chastity-requisite gender roles in Indian courts? 130 A related example comes from the intersections of gender and security concerns. Indeed, while religion and security are connected (in the debates, for example, between fundamentalism and Islamism), it is worth setting out a clear study on these relations and how security-based interventions may further or diminish the cause of gender 126 See especially Lemaitre and Sandvik, above n 33, 99; Wisor, above n 114, 344. 
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